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Abstract
This paper considers the optimal pricing and diffusion of a durable good that exhibits
positive network externalities, when consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their
expectations about future network sizes. We consider the existence of naive consumers,
as well as of sophisticated consumers who have fulfilled expectations about future net-
work sizes. At the time of purchase, naive consumers presume that the current network
size will continue over future periods. We find that the firm charges the sequential-
diffusion pricing that makes sophisticated consumers function as early adopters, unless
consumers quickly become bored with using the goods and/or unless the firm heavily
discounts its future profits. In addition, we show that naive consumers may enjoy
a greater surplus than do sophisticated consumers, implying that the firm benefits
when more consumers are sophisticated. We also compare the profitability of three
possible pricing strategies with different commitment powers: fixed, responsive, and
pre-announced pricing.
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1 Introduction
Currently, there is a growing trend for various products to be connected to the Internet,
which is known as Internet of Things (IoT), and the connection of these products enables
consumers to benefit greatly from the other consumers who join the same network (so-called
network externalities). A typical example is a home video game system. In the past, people
enjoyed playing such games with family or friends at home and, therefore, they were not
concerned with the number of other users playing the game. Recently, however, most games
have been connected to the Internet, which allows players to enjoy such games with a huge
number of other players all over the world.1 These technological advancements have expanded
consumers’ effective network size, which is the size of network range where consumers actually
care about the other consumers. Thus, it is becoming more important to correctly predict
how many users are (or will be) playing the same game when making a purchasing decision.
However, this is not an easy task. In particular, there might be considerable heterogeneity
among consumers with respect to their predictive accuracies. How will such heterogeneity
affect consumer behavior, firm strategies, and the diffusion process of goods? The main
purpose of this paper is to show the optimal pricing and the diffusion process of durable
goods that exhibit network externalities, when consumers are heterogeneous with respect to
their predictions about future network size.
We develop a simple infinite-period model in which a monopolistic firm produces a durable
good that exhibits network externalities. Consumers obtain utilities from the good for infi-
nite periods with discounting. At the same time, they become bored with the good from the
continuous use of it, that is, the good is assumed to be imperfectly durable and to depre-
ciate. When consumers decide whether to purchase the good, they must take into account
1For example, in 2016, League of Legends, a multiplayer online video game developed by Riot
Games, had over 100 million monthly active players worldwide, which outnumber the population
of Germany. The League of Legends 2017 World Championship attracted approximately 60 million
unique viewers. See also the article in the Economist : https://www.economist.com/news/business/
21726751-competitive-gaming-advances-next-level-seeking-more-sponsorships-and-fans\
\-computer-game
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not only the current network size but also the future expansion of the network size. Katz
and Shapiro (1985), the seminal work on oligopoly pricing for goods with network external-
ities, assume fulfilled expectations of consumers to capture this issue in a static one-period
model, in which the actual network size is indeed equal to the network size that consumers
expected. In reality, however, not all consumers form rational expectations. For example,
some consumers may believe that the current network size will continue as a constant over
the future, whereas others, who possess greater information, can forecast the future network
size perfectly. To consider such heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their beliefs
about future network sizes, our model consists of two types of consumers: sophisticated and
naive consumers. Sophisticated consumers have perfect foresight and, thus, can correctly
anticipate how many consumers will be participating in the network in future periods. Their
expectations will be fulfilled, as assumed in Katz and Shapiro (1985). On the other hand,
naive consumers believe that the current network size will continue as a constant in later
periods and make their purchase decisions based on such naive expectations. Note that, in
this paper, consumers are homogeneous except with regard to their expectations on future
network sizes. Therefore, we can show how the heterogeneity of such expectations affects
the optimal pricing of a monopolistic provider and the diffusion of the product.
Within the above framework of the model, this paper first considers the simple case of
fixed pricing, in which the monopoly firm offers its price at the initial period and commits
to it being fixed. We show that, unless the consumers become easily bored with the goods
and/or the firm heavily discounts its future profits, the firm embraces a sequential-diffusion
strategy that induces sophisticated consumers to purchase at the initial period and naive
consumers to follow them and purchase at the next period. Otherwise, it is optimal for the
firm to adopt a simultaneous-diffusion strategy, under which all consumers purchase at the
initial period. With the simultaneous-diffusion strategy, the firm can obtain all profits at
the initial period without them being discounted. However, because the naive consumers
believe, at the time of their purchase, that the current market size, which is zero, will continue
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over the future periods, their willingness to pay for the good would be low. Therefore, a
large price discount is required to convince them to purchase along with the sophisticated
consumers at the initial period. On the other hand, with the sequential-diffusion strategy,
the firm can charge a higher price whereas the profit from the naive consumers will be
obtained at the second period. If the higher price is charged, naive consumers do not
purchase the good at the initial period. However, the sophisticated consumers rationally
expect that if all the sophisticated consumers purchase at the initial period, they will be
able to profit from the larger network size hereafter because the naive consumers will join
the network at the next period. In sum, the advantages of the sequential-diffusion price would
outweigh its disadvantages, unless the consumers become easily bored with using the goods
and/or the firm significantly discounts its future profits. This result implies that whether the
monopoly firm can exploit the sophisticated consumers as early adopters crucially depends
on the durability of the product, the discount rates of the consumers and the firm, and the
heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their expectations on the future network
path.
In addition, we show an interesting result that highlights the advantages of na¨ıvete´: in
equilibrium, sophisticated consumers never enjoy a greater surplus than do naive consumers.
When the simultaneous-diffusion strategy prevails in equilibrium, both sophisticated and
naive consumers derive the same surplus. However, when the sequential-diffusion strategy
prevails in equilibrium, the surplus of sophisticated consumers is strictly less than that of
naive consumers. With the sequential-diffusion price, sophisticated consumers can anticipate
that naive consumers never join the network unless all sophisticated consumers do so. Thus,
sophisticated consumers have no other way than participating in the network first to lead the
subsequent entries of the naive consumers. As a result, at the initial period, sophisticated
consumers have to endure the small network externalities among themselves and they become
bored with the good to some extent before the network externalities are maximized at the
next period. Moreover, of special interest is when consumers become easily bored. In this
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case, the equilibrium surplus of the sophisticated consumers converges to zero. In other
words, the firm can extract surplus from them perfectly.
From the viewpoint of the firm, the above discussion indicates that, with the sequential-
diffusion strategy, the firm can extract more surplus from sophisticated consumers. We
demonstrate that, as the ratio of sophisticated consumers increases, the firm charges a higher
price and, thus, gains greater profits. That is, the firm benefits from more consumers being
sophisticated.
We extend the model in a way that the firm chooses different prices for every period to
confirm the robustness of our result that the sequential-diffusion strategy is optimal for the
monopolistic firm, unless consumers and/or the firm heavily discount their future payoffs.
We consider two cases: (i) responsive pricing, where the firm adjusts the price at every
period, and (ii) pre-announced pricing, where the firm commits to the future price path
at the initial period. In both cases, we derive a qualitatively similar result regarding the
optimality of sequential-diffusion pricing. Furthermore, we confirm that Coase’s conjecture
holds: committing to the future price path can raise the profits of the firm.
Finally, given that the sequential-diffusion strategy is optimal for the firm, the following
question may arise: What is the best commitment strategy? The answer is simple. Commit-
ting to the future price path (i.e., pre-announced pricing) is naturally the first-best strategy.
However, it would be difficult to make such a full commitment in reality. Therefore, next
question concerns the second-best commitment strategy: Which is more profitable for the
firm, committing to a fixed price or not? We show that the answer depends on the rate at
which consumers become bored with the good and on the discount factor for consumers. If
the firm does not commit to a fixed price, sophisticated consumers have a greater incentive
to postpone their purchase to the next period because doing so enables them to win a price
discount and enjoy the full network from their first period of use. Therefore, by committing
to a fixed price, the firm can effectively extract a larger surplus from sophisticated consumers.
However, this does not apply when consumers heavily discount their future payoffs and/or
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when the effective network size is very small. In these cases, it would be profitable not to
commit to a fixed price.
1.1 Related literature
The existence of strategic forward-looking consumers is empirically reported (e.g., Hendel
and Nevo, 2013; Li et al., 2014).2 Hendel and Nevo (2013) estimate the fraction of forward-
looking consumers, who can stockpile the goods. Li et al. (2014) estimate that 5.2% to
19.2% of the population is strategic, using data from the air-travel industry. Although
the structural model that these papers utilize does not incorporate network externalities,
they provide empirical evidence that both strategic and non-strategic consumers exist in
the market. The strategic relationship between firms and strategic consumers has been
studied using theoretical frameworks of management science (e.g., Besanko and Winston,
1990; Besbes and Lobel, 2015; Cachon and Feldman, 2015; Cachon and Swinney, 2009;
Jerath et al., 2010; Liu and Van Ryzin, 2008; Mersereau and Zhang, 2012).3 Regarding the
effect of strategic consumers on firms’ profits, mixed results are obtained: Su (2007) and Cho
et al. (2009) find that there is a positive effect, whereas Anderson and Wilson (2003), Aviv
and Pazgal (2008), and Levin et al. (2009) reveal negative aspects. However, these papers
do not examine network externalities.
Ajorlou et al. (2016) studies the model of optimal dynamic pricing with social network,
where information about goods will be spread through word-of-mouth communications among
consumers. Papanastasiou and Savva (2017) show that the presence of social learning may
improve the expected profit of firm. In these studies, even though there do not exist network
externalities, consumers form their beliefs about the product’s quality from word-of-mouth
communications or reviews by those who have already purchase. Therefore, the presence
of social network or social learning incentivizes the firm to increase the number of early
2Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Nair (2007) assume that all consumers are forward-looking. In contrast,
Li et al. (2014) do not assume the existence of strategic consumers a priori.
3The revenue losses from ignoring strategic consumers are estimated to vary from 20% in Aviv and Pazgal
(2008) to 60% in Besanko and Winston (1990).
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adopters, which operates similarly to network externalities of our model.
The present paper is also related to the vast economic literature on network externalities,
pioneered by Katz and Shapiro (1985), who studied a static model in which consumers have
rational expectations about the network size. In their rational expectations equilibrium,
the actual network size does indeed equal the network size that all consumers expected.
Because all consumers are assumed to have identical expectations regarding the network
size and identical valuations of the good, the model can be reduced to a one-period static
model. Some studies that incorporate heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their
valuations for the good show that the price of durable goods with network externalities
increases over time, contrary to Coase (1972), that is, introductory or penetration pricing
prevails in equilibrium4 (e.g., Bensaid and Lesne, 1996; Cabral et al., 1999; Cabral, 2011;
Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000).5 These papers assume that all consumers base their purchase
decisions on rational expectations.
On the other hand, there are some studies that incorporate consumers who lack the ability
to form forward-looking expectations, such that the utility of every consumer depends on
the number of users at the moment of purchase, and is not affected by the future network
size. (e.g., Arthur, 1989; Chen et al., 2009; Doganoglu, 2003; Makhdoumi et al., 2017;
Mitchell and Skrzypacz, 2006).6 However, there has been little investigation of the dynamic
pricing when consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their expectations about the
future network size of a durable good. Radner et al. (2014) assume the existence of bounded
rational consumers who do not pay attention to the monopolist’s price announcement, that
is, their decisions remain unchanged from the previous period. They show that an optimal
4Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985) show that firms offer a low introductory
price in equilibrium. In these papers, however, the low price set at the initial period might be caused by
competition among firms that struggle to establish installed base customers in advance of their rival firms.
5Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) assume that consumers purchase the good only when they are young, to
avoid discussing Coasian dynamics. Bensaid and Lesne (1996) allow consumers to choose the timing of
purchase in a discrete time model.
6Arthur (1989) considers an adoption process for technology, where agents sequentially come into the
market and choose which technology to adopt. However, optimal pricing is not investigated, that is, it is
assumed that the technologies are not sponsored or strategically manipulated by any profit-maximizing firm.
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pricing plan monotonically decreases (increases) to the steady-state price level if the initial
subscription rate is above (below) the subscription rate at the steady state. Miao (2010)
considers two types of consumers: foresighted and myopic consumers. Foresighted consumers
maximize the discounted sum of their utilities, whereas myopic consumers choose to optimize
period-by-period. The market they have in mind is for a system good, consisting of two
complementary goods (e.g., a printer and cartridges). Consumers are assumed to live for
three periods. At the initial period, the consumers choose which printer to purchase. At
the remaining two periods, they will consume cartridges only. Unlike the myopic consumers
of Miao (2010), we consider naive consumers according to Cabral (2011), who defines the
naive consumer as ‘one who assumes that network size will remain at its current level, i.e. a
consumer who fails to “solve” the model and correctly predict the evolution of network size.’
In sum, to our knowledge, no paper provides theoretical predictions on optimal pricing
and the diffusion process for durable goods with network externalities when there are naive
consumers as well as forward-looking rational consumers.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
analyzes the optimal pricing and the diffusion process when the monopoly firm commits
to a fixed price. We show that the firm charges the sequential-diffusion price at which
sophisticated consumers purchase the good before naive consumers, unless both the firm and
the consumers discount their future payoffs too heavily. Section 4 considers responsive and
pre-announced pricing strategies. Section 5 considers the first- and second-best commitment
strategies and examines the condition under which committing to a fixed price is more
profitable for the firm than responsive pricing. We find that whether committing to a fixed
price is profitable depends on the parameter values. Section 6 provides a discussion on the
implications for management. Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs are deferred to the
Appendix.
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2 Model
We consider an infinite-period model in which a monopolistic firm sells a durable good that
exhibits positive network externalities. Consumers obtain utilities for infinite periods with
discounting. The utility of consumers increases with the number of other consumers using
the good. The firm sets the price in the initial period, t = 1, and commits to it for the
subsequent periods to maximize the present discounted value. We will relax this assumption
in Section 4 such that the firm can set different prices in each period. We denote the discount
factor for the firm by δF ∈ [0, 1). We assume a constant marginal cost of producing the good,
which is normalized to zero.
Each consumer derives a stand-alone benefit from using the good for each period, which
can be normalized to zero without loss of generality. This paper focuses on the utility from
network externalities, which is denoted by v(nt) (v
′ > 0 and v(0) = 0), where nt is the non-
negative integer representing the actual number of consumers who join the network at period
t. At the beginning of each period, consumers can observe the prior period’s network size
(or the total number of sales) and then choose whether to purchase the good. At the time
of purchasing, each consumer forms an expectation about the continuation path of future
network sizes. Katz and Shapiro (1985) assume that consumers’ expectations are fulfilled,
such that the actual network size does indeed equal the network size that consumers expected
ex ante. In reality, however, not all consumers form expectations that will be fulfilled. Some
consumers might believe erroneously that the network will remain at its current size during
future periods, whereas others correctly anticipate future increases in network sizes.
To investigate the diffusion of durable goods in more realistic situations, this paper
considers two types of consumers: sophisticated consumers and naive consumers. We use nS
and nN to denote the number of sophisticated and naive consumers, respectively (n = nS +
nN). The two types of consumers are identical except for their expectations. Sophisticated
consumers have perfect foresight and, thus, can correctly anticipate how many consumers
will be participating in the network for subsequent periods. That is, they can rationally
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forecast the number of consumers at period t to be nt for all t ∈ T = {1, 2, · · · }. Let ueS(t)
and uS(t), respectively, be the expected and actual present discounted sum of utilities of the
sophisticated consumers, who purchase (and start using) the good at (from) period t. In our
model, the expected and the actual present discounted values of the sophisticated consumers
are equal (i.e., ueS(t) = uS(t)). Then, we have:
uS(t) = u
e
S(t) =
∞∑
k=t
[{δC(1− β)}k−t · v(nk)] ,
where δC ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor for consumers and β ∈ [0, 1) represents the depreci-
ation rate of the durable good, as in Bond and Samuelson (1984) and Suslow (1986).7 The
depreciation rate β can also be interpreted as the rate at which consumers become bored with
the good. For example, in the video game industry, players become bored with a game after
continuous usage, even if the game maintains a huge base of players.
In contrast, naive consumers do not (and cannot) anticipate the network sizes at any
future period and simply presume that the current network size will continue.8 Therefore,
the naive consumers decide whether to purchase the good based on the current network size
that they perceive at the time of purchase. Let ueN(t) and uN(t), respectively, be the expected
and actual present discounted sum of utilities of the naive consumers, who purchase (and
start using) the good at (from) period t. These are given as follows.
uN(t) =
∞∑
k=t
[{δC(1− β)}k−t · v(nk)]
ueN(t) =
∞∑
k=t
[{δC(1− β)}k−t · v(nt−1 + 1)]
At the beginning of period t, each naive consumer recognizes the current network size to be
nt−1 and anticipates that it will be nt−1 + 1 for the subsequent periods if he/she purchases
at that period. Because all naive consumers make the same purchase decision (i.e., nk ≥
7Considering δC and β separately is important when analyzing the consumers’ decisions on whether to
postpone their purchases, as analyzed in Section 4.1.
8A naive consumer is defined as ‘one who assumes that network size will remain at its current level, i.e. a
consumer who fails to “solve” the model and correctly predict the evolution of network size.’ (Cabral, 2011:
p.95)
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nt−1 + 1 for all k ≥ t), it always holds that ueN(t) ≤ uN(t), which means that they could
eventually obtain a higher value than their willingness to pay they expected ex ante. Let
by Vi(t) = ui(t)− p denote the indirect utility function and let V ei (t) = uei (t)− p denote the
expected indirect utility function for i = {S,N}, where p is the price of the durable good set
by the firm. Henceforth, for simplicity, we define the consumers’ combined discount factor
as λC ≡ δC(1− β) ∈ [0, 1).
3 Monopolist commits to a fixed price
This section derives the optimal fixed pricing for the durable good with network externalities
in equilibrium. In our model, the firm’s optimal pricing strategy is one of the following two
strategies. The first option is a simultaneous-diffusion strategy, in which the firm sets a price
such that both sophisticated and naive consumers will simultaneously purchase the good at
period 1. The second option is a sequential-diffusion strategy, in which the firm offers a price
such that sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and act as early adopters, whereas
naive consumers purchase the good at period 2, following the lead of the sophisticated
consumers.
The reason why other strategies are not optimal is as follows. First, there will never be a
situation of diffusion in which naive consumers purchase the goods before the sophisticated
consumers do. Suppose that the firm offers a price such that naive consumers are willing to
purchase. Under that price, sophisticated consumers would form a higher present discounted
value than would naive consumers because they can anticipate that all naive consumers will
purchase the good. Thus, sophisticated consumers will purchase the good first and they never
purchase the good after naive consumers. Next, there will never be a situation of diffusion in
which only the sophisticated consumers purchase and no naive consumer purchases. Suppose
that there exists a price such that only sophisticated consumers would purchase. Note that
this price needs to satisfy p ≤ ∑∞k=t [λk−tC · v(nS)]. At the next period, naive consumers
will observe that all sophisticated consumers have purchased the good. Here, the expected
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present discounted value of naive consumers is computed as
∑∞
k=t
[
λk−tC · v(nS + 1)
]
, which
is strictly greater than the price offered by the firm. Therefore, the naive consumers will
follow the sophisticated consumers after a delay of one period.
We will derive the optimal price among all simultaneous-diffusion strategies in Section
3.1 and among all sequential-diffusion strategies in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 addresses the
optimal strategy for the firm by comparing the profits derived in both strategies.
3.1 Simultaneous-diffusion strategy
To diffuse the good to both sophisticated and naive consumers at the same time, the price
needs to be less than or equal to the expected present discounted sum of utilities of all
consumers. That is, letting psim be the simultaneous-diffusion price, the price should satisfy
the following condition.
psim ≤ min{ueS(t = 1|psim), ueN(t = 1|psim)}
= min
{ ∞∑
t=1
λt−1C v(n),
∞∑
t=1
λt−1C v(1)
}
= min
{
v(n)
1− λC ,
v(1)
1− λC
}
=
v(1)
1− λC
The price is set at the expected present discounted sum of utilities of the naive consumers,
that is, psim = v(1)/(1 − λC). Contrary to the expectations of the naive consumers, all
consumers actually join the network at period 1. Therefore, the ex-post or actual surplus of
consumers is computed as follows.
V simi =
∞∑
t=1
[
λt−1C v(n)
]− psim = v(n)− v(1)
1− λC (i = S,N)
The profit of the firm can be derived as nv(1)/(1−λC). The following proposition summarizes
the results.
Proposition 1. The optimal simultaneous-diffusion price such that both sophisticated and
naive consumers purchase at period 1 is as follows:
psim =
v(1)
1− λC
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The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows:
pisim =
nv(1)
1− λC , V
sim
S = V
sim
N =
v(n)− v(1)
1− λC
Proposition 1 implies that the firm sets the price at the expected present discounted sum
of utilities of the naive consumers in order to diffuse the good to all consumers at period 1.
It would be necessary to aggressively discount the price to meet the preferences of the naive
consumers.
In addition, we have the following corollary regarding consumer surplus.
Corollary 1. Both sophisticated and naive consumers derive the same surplus under the
simultaneous-diffusion pricing.
3.2 Sequential-diffusion strategy
Here, we consider the optimal sequential-diffusion prices such that sophisticated consumers
purchase the good before naive consumers do.9 Let pseq be the sequential-diffusion price,
which should satisfy the following two conditions.
ueN(t = 1|pseq) <pseq ≤ ueS(t = 1|pseq) (1)
pseq ≤ ueN(t = 2|pseq) (2)
Inequality (1) implies that only sophisticated consumers purchase the good at period 1.
Inequality (2) guarantees that naive consumers will purchase at period 2 after observing that
all sophisticated consumers purchased at period 1. Given that pseq satisfies both inequalities,
ueS(t = 1|pseq), ueN(t = 1|pseq), and ueN(t = 2|pseq) can be computed as follows.
ueS(t = 1|pseq) = v(nS) +
∞∑
t=2
[
λt−1C v(n)
]
= v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
9Note that even if naive consumers purchase later than the sophisticated consumers do, their purchase
cannot be delayed by more than one period. That is, naive consumers purchase the good at just the next
period following the purchase by the sophisticated consumers. In our model, naive consumers are assumed
to make their purchase decisions based on the network size, formed at the beginning of the period. Suppose
that sophisticated consumers purchase the good at period 1. If no naive consumers purchased at period 2,
it might also be unprofitable for them to purchase at period 3 and later periods.
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ueN(t = 1|pseq) =
∞∑
t=1
[
λt−1C v(1)
]
=
v(1)
1− λC
ueN(t = 2|pseq) =
∞∑
t=2
[
λt−2C v(nS + 1)
]
=
v(nS + 1)
1− λC
The firm offers the highest price that satisfies inequalities (1) and (2), which is equivalent
to min{ueS(t = 1|pseq), ueN(t = 2|pseq)}. We can state the following proposition regarding the
optimal prices among the sequential-diffusion prices.
Proposition 2. The optimal sequential-diffusion prices such that sophisticated consumers
purchase before naive consumers do is given by:
pseq =

v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C ,
v(nS + 1)
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1,
where λ¯C =
v(nS + 1)− v(nS)
v(n)− v(nS) .
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows.
piseq = pseq · nS + δF · pseq · nN
V seqS =

0 if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C
λC{v(n)− v(nS)} − {v(nS + 1)− v(nS)}
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
V seqN =

v(n)− v(nS) if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
Note that, under this pricing strategy, there is no incentive for any sophisticated consumer
to delay purchase to the next period. The price is set at a level at which naive consumers
purchase the good at period 2 only if they observe that all sophisticated consumers have
already purchased. If a sophisticated consumer deviated from buying the good at period 1,
no naive consumers would purchase at period 2. Therefore, the deviation never enables each
14
sophisticated consumer to enjoy the largest network size from the start of his/her use of the
good, and never improves his/her payoffs.
Proposition 2 implies that the optimal price depends on the combined discount factor
for consumers λC . When consumers do not heavily discount and/or do not quickly become
bored of using the good (i.e., λC > λ¯C), the firm offers a price equal to the willingness to pay
of naive consumers at period 2, given that sophisticated consumers have already purchased,
that is, pseq = ueN(t = 2|pseq). Note that the willingness to pay of each naive consumer is
formed based on the belief that his/her purchase will increase the network size from nS to
nS + 1 because the naive consumers cannot anticipate that other naive consumers also join
the network at the same time. In contrast to their forecast, all naive consumers do join the
network eventually. Thus, although the price is set at the willingness to pay of the naive
consumers, they can eventually derive a positive surplus. In sum, both sophisticated and
naive consumers enjoy a positive surplus.
Of special interest is the case in which consumers heavily discount and/or quickly become
bored (i.e., λC < λ¯C). In this case, as u
e
S(t = 1|pseq) < ueN(t = 2|pseq), the firm offers a
price equal to the willingness to pay of the sophisticated consumers at period 1, that is,
pseq = ueS(t = 1|pseq). Because their willingness to pay is based on their perfect forecast of
the future network sizes, unlike naive consumers, the surplus of the sophisticated consumers
becomes zero. On the other hand, naive consumers purchase the good after observing that
all sophisticated consumers have purchased at period 1, which implies that a sufficient size of
network has been established. Therefore, only naive consumers can gain a positive surplus.
Note that the parameter range narrows as the effective network size increases, that is, λ¯C
goes to 0 as n increases. As n gets larger, at period 2, there is a larger difference between the
network size that the naive consumers expect, nS+1, and the actually formed network size, n.
In other words, naive consumers significantly underestimate the discounted sum of utilities
from the network, that is, ueN(t = 2|pseq) becomes smaller compared with ueS(t = 1|pseq).
Therefore, when the effective network size is large, ueS(t = 1|pseq) < ueN(t = 2|pseq) tends not
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to be satisfied, which leads to a small value of λ¯C .
We have the following corollary regarding the consumer surplus.
Corollary 2. Naive consumers derive a higher surplus than do sophisticated consumers with
the sequential-diffusion price. That is, it always holds that V seqS < V
seq
N .
The intuition behind the advantage of na¨ıvete´ in Corollary 2 is that sophisticated con-
sumers have to endure the disadvantages of the small network at period 1, whereas naive
consumers can enjoy benefits of the full network from the beginning of their use of the
product.
3.3 Optimal diffusion strategy
Here, using the results derived in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we address the optimal pricing for a
monopolistic firm selling a durable good that exhibits network externalities. First, comparing
the simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The sequential-diffusion price is always higher than the simultaneous-diffusion
price. That is, psim < pseq holds.
Lemma 1 confirms the predictable result that the firm can charge a higher price to
diffuse the good sequentially. Next, comparing the profits with simultaneous- and sequential-
diffusion prices, we have the following proposition regarding the optimal pricing of the firm.
Proposition 3. It is optimal for the monopolistic firm to charge the sequential-diffusion
price pseq if and only if the discount factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF >
max {f(λC) , 0}, where
f(λC) =

nv(1)− nS {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)}
nN {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)} if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C ,
nv(1)− nSv(nS + 1)
nNv(nS + 1)
if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1.
Otherwise, it is optimal to charge the simultaneous-diffusion price psim.
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Figure 1: Simultaneous- vs. sequential-diffusion pricing
Note that f(λC) is decreasing for λC ∈ [0, λ¯C ] and is constant for λC ∈ [λ¯C , 1]. Figure 1
shows the partition of the equilibrium price by the firm using numerical analysis.
All three panels of the figure show that the firm offers the sequential-diffusion price when
δF is larger than the critical value f(λC), indicating that the sequential-diffusion strategy is
more profitable for the firm when the firm’s discount factor is sufficiently large. It seems to be
a natural result. With the simultaneous-diffusion strategy, all profits can be obtained without
being discounted, but a large price discount is required to make naive consumers purchase
along with sophisticated consumers, as shown in Lemma 1. In contrast, with the sequential-
diffusion strategy, the profit from naive consumers will be obtained at period 2 with being
discounted. However, as shown in Lemma 1, the firm can charge a higher price because
of the leadership of sophisticated consumers. In addition, the left and center panels of the
figure illustrate the case of v(nt) = nt, indicating that the sequential-diffusion pricing would
be optimal for the firm if the effective network size is sufficiently large. The left panel shows
the case where the effective network size is small, indicating that the simultaneous-diffusion
strategy is more likely to be beneficial if the combined discount factor of the consumer is
small. Finally, the right panel illustrates the case where v(nt) = n
0.2
t , implying weak network
externalities. A comparison of the center and right panels of the figure indicates that the
stronger is the network effect of the durables, the greater is the advantage of the sequential-
diffusion strategy for the firm.
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Furthermore, with Corollaries 1 and 2, we obtain the following proposition with respect
to the surpluses of both consumer types.
Proposition 4. Sophisticated consumers never enjoy a greater surplus than do naive con-
sumers.
Under the simultaneous-diffusion strategy, both types of consumers derive the same sur-
plus because they purchase the good at the same price and at the same time. More interest-
ingly, under the sequential-diffusion strategy, the surplus of sophisticated consumers is less
than that of naive consumers. With the sequential-diffusion price, naive consumers never
join the network before sophisticated consumers (the early-adopters) do so. Because sophis-
ticated consumers expect such behavior of the naive consumers, they have no option but
to participate in the network first. As a result, sophisticated consumers have to endure the
disadvantages of a small network at period 1. However, when the naive consumers purchase
at the next period, they can immediately enjoy the advantages of the largest network size.
Therefore, naive consumers obtain agreater surplus than do sophisticated consumers.
Let us reconsider the above discussion from the viewpoint of the firm. Under the
simultaneous-diffusion strategy, the firm extracts the same surplus from every consumer. On
the other hand, under the sequential-diffusion strategy, the firm can extract more surplus
from the sophisticated consumers by charging a higher price to all consumers. In summary,
we can state the following proposition regarding the preceding discussion.
Proposition 5. Assume that the total number of consumers n is constant. Let α be the ratio
of sophisticated consumers, that is, nS = αn and nN = (1 − α)n. Then, the simultaneous-
diffusion price psim does not depend on α, whereas an increase in α raises the sequential-
diffusion price pseq and the profit of the firm piseq.
Proposition 5 provides the comparative statics of the firm’s profit with respect to the
ratio between the two types of consumers. It shows that the simultaneous-diffusion price
does not depend on the ratio between the sophisticated and naive consumers. However,
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under the sequential-diffusion strategy, as the ratio of sophisticated consumers increases, the
firm charges them the higher price and then gains a greater profit. That is, the firm benefits
from more consumers being sophisticated.
4 Responsive and pre-announced pricing strategies
The purpose of this section is to confirm the robustness of Proposition 3, that the sequential-
diffusion strategy prevails in equilibrium unless the firm heavily discounts its future profits,
even if the firm can set different prices at each period. Section 4.1 considers the case of
responsive pricing, in which the firm can dynamically adjust the price at every period. We
also consider the case of pre-announced pricing in Section 4.2, in which the firm can commit
to the future price path that it will charge. After confirming the robustness of our main
result in both cases, in Section 4.3, we confirm that Coase’s prediction, that committing to
a future price path improves the firm’s profit, holds in our model.
4.1 Responsive pricing
Let pt be the price of the good at period t. As in Section 3, we focus on the simultaneous- and
sequential-diffusion strategies. Note that the ability of the firm to change its prices across
periods (or equivalently, the lack of a price commitment) does not affect the analysis of the
simultaneous-diffusion strategy, under which all consumers purchase the good at period 1.
Therefore, we analyze the sequential-diffusion strategy when the firm can adjust its price at
every period and then find the condition under which such a sequential-diffusion strategy is
optimal for the firm.
Proposition 6. If the consumers’ discount factor and the depreciation rate are small enough
to satisfy:
δCβ <
v(nS)− v(1)
v(n)− v(nS) , (3)
then there exists the price pair (pˆseq1 , pˆ
seq
2 ) such that sophisticated consumers purchase at
19
period 1 and naive consumers purchase at period 2, where pˆseq1 and pˆ
seq
2 are given by
pˆseq1 =
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC , pˆ
seq
2 =
v(nS + 1)
1− λC .
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows.
pˆiseq = pˆseq1 nS + δF · pˆseq2 nN , Vˆ seqS = δC ·
v(n)− v(nS)
1− λC , Vˆ
seq
N =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC .
Equation (3) represents the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy pre-
vails in equilibrium. Compared with the fixed-pricing case, in this case, sophisticated con-
sumers have a greater strategic incentive to postpone their purchases in order to match the
timing of purchase with naive followers because doing so could reduce the price offered at
period 2. Details are provided in the Appendix, but let us explain the intuition briefly as
follows. Proposition 6 shows that pˆseq1 is decreasing in β, that is, the period 1 price decreases
as consumers become easily bored. When consumers become easily bored with a product,
sophisticated consumers have a greater incentive to start using the good when the network
is at its largest possible size. In other words, each sophisticated consumer would be likely
to delay purchase to the next period in which all the naive consumers will join the network.
As a result of these deviation incentives, the firm cannot charge the higher price at period
1. On the other hand, if the firm offers too low a price, naive consumers will also purchase
the good at period 1. Therefore, under responsive pricing, the firm cannot perform the
sequential-diffusion strategy when consumers become easily bored with the product.
Next, we derive the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy is more prof-
itable for the firm when it can adjust its price at every period, as summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the monopolistic firm can adjust its price at every period. It
is optimal for the firm to charge the sequential-diffusion prices (pˆseq1 , pˆ
seq
2 ) if and only if the
discount factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF > max
{
fˆ(δC , β) , 0
}
, where
fˆ(δC , β) ≡ nv(1)− nS {v(nS)− δCβ (v(n)− v(nS))}
nN · v(nS + 1) .
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Proposition 7 implies that it is more profitable for the firm to charge the sequential-
diffusion prices unless the discount factor for the firm is too small. Therefore, the result of
Proposition 3 is qualitatively unchanged even if the firm can adjust its price at every period.
Proposition 7 also implies that ∂fˆ(δC , β)/∂δC = ∂fˆ(δC , β)/∂β > 0. With responsive
pricing, the sequential-diffusion pricing is more likely to be beneficial to the firm when con-
sumers discount the future payoff more (i.e., when δC gets smaller) and/or when consumers
become bored less easily (i.e., when β gets smaller). In contrast, with fixed pricing, we have
∂f(λC)/∂δC ≤ 0 and ∂f(λC)/∂β ≥ 0. That is, the change in δC has the opposite impact on
the thresholds under the fixed and responsive pricing strategies. An increase in δC directly
increases the present discount value and the willingness to pay of all consumers. Under fixed
pricing, this direct effect enables the firm to charge the higher sequential-diffusion price be-
cause the firm commits to the fixed price such that no sophisticated consumers benefit by
delaying their purchase. However, if the firm cannot make such a binding commitment but
adopts responsive pricing, the increase in δC also affects has the behavior of sophisticated
consumers. As δC becomes larger, the sophisticated consumers have a greater incentive to
delay their purchases to the next period, which would lead the firm to offer a larger price
discount. As a result, under responsive pricing, the second indirect effect dominates the
first direct effect. That is why an increase in δC makes the sequential-diffusion strategy less
profitable for the firm.
4.2 Pre-announced pricing
Here, we consider the case in which the firm can perfectly commit to a future price path.
For the same reason as in Section 4.1, we first analyze the sequential-diffusion strategy and
then find the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy is optimal for the firm.
Proposition 8. When the monopolist can commit to a future price path, the optimal price
pair (p˜seq1 , p˜
seq
2 ), such that sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and naive consumers
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purchase at period 2, is given by:
p˜seq1 = v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC , p˜
seq
2 =
v(nS + 1)
1− λC ,
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows.
p˜iseq = p˜seqnS + δF · p˜seqnN , V˜ seqS = 0, V˜ seqN =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC
The firm sets the period 1 price at the level of the sophisticated consumers’ willingness to
pay. Similarly, the period 2 price is set at the naive consumers’ willingness to pay. Because
sophisticated consumers form fulfilled expectations, their surplus will be fully extracted by
the firm. In contrast, because naive consumers underestimate the network value of the good
at the time of purchase, they can eventually gain a positive surplus.
Next, we derive the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy is more prof-
itable for the firm when it can commit to a future price path, as summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose that the monopolistic firm can commit to a future price path. It
is optimal for the firm to charge the sequential-diffusion prices (p˜seq1 , p˜
seq
2 ) if and only if the
discount factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF > max
{
f˜(λC) , 0
}
, where:
f˜(λC) ≡ nv(1)− nS {(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)}
nN · v(nS + 1) .
Proposition 9 confirms the robustness of Proposition 3, that is, the sequential-diffusion
strategy is optimal for the firm unless the firm greatly discounts its future profits.
4.3 Profitability of pre-announcement
Here, we check Coase’s prediction that committing to a future price path can improve the
profit of the monopolist. To this end, comparing pˆiseq and p˜iseq yields the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 10. Committing to the future price path improves the profit of the monopolistic
firm.
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It can be easily shown that pˆiseq < p˜iseq, which implies that Coase’s prediction holds
in our model with naive consumers. From Propositions 6 and 8, we can see pˆseq1 < p˜
seq
1
and pˆseq2 = p˜
seq
2 . When the firm cannot commit to its future prices, it must discount the
period 1 price to prevent the sophisticated consumers from postponing their purchases to
the next period. However, when the firm precommits to the period 2 price, the sophisticated
consumers cannot obtain any price discount by postponing their purchase. As a result, the
firm benefits from committing to the future price path because it can charge the higher price
at period 1.
5 First- and Second-Best Commitment Strategies
So far, we have analyzed three cases: (i) fixed pricing, (ii) responsive pricing, and (iii) pre-
announced pricing. This section demonstrates the first- and second-best strategies for the
firm. To this end, we confine our attention to the parameter range in which the firm adopts
the sequential-diffusion strategy, which is equivalent to δF ∈ [max{f(λC), fˆ(δC , β), f˜(λC), 0}, 1),
because it is shown in all cases that the sequential-diffusion strategy is optimal for the firm
unless the firm too heavily discounts its future profits.
First, it can easily be seen that pre-announced pricing is the optimal strategy for the firm
of the three strategies. Proposition 10 shows that pre-announced pricing is more profitable
than responsive pricing. It is also preferable to fixed fixed pricing, as indicated by strategy
space of the fixed pricing being a subset of the strategy space of the pre-announced pricing.
Therefore, the pre-announced pricing is the first-best strategy if it is possible for the firm to
implement it.
However, in reality, it is difficult to the firm to credibly commit to complete path of future
prices at the initial period, but committing to a fixed price may be more implementable.
Thus, a comparison of fixed and responsive pricing indicates the second-best strategy re-
garding the firm’s commitment. We have the following proposition regarding the order of
the sequential-diffusion prices under both cases.
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Proposition 11. The sequential-diffusion prices under fixed pricing (i.e., pseq) and respon-
sive pricing (i.e., pˆseq1 and pˆ
seq
2 ), respectively, are ordered as follows:{
pˆseq1 < p
seq < pˆseq2 if 0 ≤ λC < λ¯C
pˆseq1 < pˆ
seq
2 = p
seq if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1.
Proposition 11 implies that pˆseq1 is always lower than pˆ
seq
2 . In other words, when the
firm can adjust the price at every period, the introductory or penetration pricing prevails in
equilibrium, as shown in Bensaid and Lesne (1996) and Cabral et al. (1999).
When λC is large enough to satisfy λC ≥ λ¯C , the fixed sequential-diffusion price pseq is
higher than pˆseq1 and is equal to pˆ
seq
2 . Therefore, in this case, it is obviously more profitable
to commit to the fixed price. In contrast, when λC is smaller than λ¯C , p
seq is higher than pseq1
and lower than pseq2 , which increases the possibility that the firm will benefit by employing
responsive pricing. We find the condition under which responsive pricing is more beneficial
than fixed pricing.
Proposition 12. Suppose that the discount factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy
max{f(λC), fˆ(δC , β), 0} ≤ δF < 1. If
λ¯C − λC > δC
δF
· nS
nN
, (4)
then it is unprofitable for the firm to commit to the fixed price at period 1. Otherwise, the
firm can benefit from committing to the fixed price.
Proposition 12 shows three results: (i) if λ ≥ λ¯C , then the condition (4) is not satisfied,
that is, fixed pricing is always more profitable than responsive pricing; (ii) when λ < λ¯C ,
as δC/δF and/or nS/nN become smaller, responsive pricing is more likely to be profitable
than fixed pricing; and (iii) when the effective network size n is small, λ¯C becomes large,
which increases the likelihood that responsive pricing is more likely to be profitable than
fixed pricing.
The intuition behind the results is as follows. Result (i) is obvious from Proposition
11. With regard to Result (ii), under sequential-diffusion pricing, some price discounts
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Figure 2: Fixed vs. responsive pricing strategies (α = 0.2, δF = 0.9).
are required to prevent sophisticated consumers from delaying their purchases to the next
period. Under fixed pricing, these price discounts will be applied not only to sophisticated
consumers but also to naive consumers. In contrast, under responsive pricing, the firm can
stop discounting for naive consumers by adjusting its price at period 2. If δC/δF becomes
smaller, then larger price discounts are required, which increases the advantage of responsive
pricing. If nS/nN becomes smaller, then, under fixed pricing, the price discounts would
apply to naive consumers, which also increases the advantages of responsive pricing. Finally,
regarding Result (iii), λ¯C will take a large value when the effective network size is small, as
discussed in Section 3.2. As shown in Proposition 2, when λ¯C is large, the willingness to pay
of the sophisticated consumers is lower than that of the naive consumers. As a result, under
fixed pricing, the sequential-diffusion price tends to be set at the level of the sophisticated
consumers’ willingness to pay, and is also applied to naive consumers, despite their higher
willingness to pay. In contrast, under responsive pricing, the firm will be able to adjust its
price at period 2 to avoid discounting the price offered to naive consumers. Thus, when the
effective network effect is small, responsive pricing is more likely to be profitable than fixed
pricing.
Finally, we perform numerical analyses to illustrate the above results of Proposition 12
and to discuss how the result would be affected by the effective network size, n. We consider
a sufficiently large value of δF = 0.9 for the sequential-diffusion strategy to be optimal. In
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addition, we let v(nt) =
√
nt and α = 0.2, that is, nS = 0.2n and nN = 0.8n. Note that
varying α does not qualitatively change our numerical results. In each panel of Figure 2, we
define g1(δC) and g2(δC) as follows:
g1(δC) ≡ v(nS)− v(1)
v(n)− v(nS) ·
1
δC
, g2(δC) ≡ 1−
(
λ¯C
δC
− nS
δFnN
)
,
where the former comes from condition (3) in Proposition 6 and the latter from condition
(4) in Proposition 12. In the region of β < g1(δC), sophisticated consumers purchase at
period 1 and naive consumers purchase at period 2. In the region of β > g2(δC), the firm
can obtain higher profits under responsive pricing than under fixed pricing. The shaded
area of each graph in the figure represents the parameter region where responsive pricing is
more profitable for the firm, which shrinks gradually as n increases. In other words, when
the effective network size is relatively small, it would be profitable for the firm to make no
commitments to future prices.
6 Managerial implications
The central message from our study is that the sequential-diffusion strategy is profitable for
the monopolistic firm selling durable goods that exhibit network externalities, unless the firm
heavily discounts its future profits. Furthermore, sophisticated consumers, because of their
sophistication, get lower surplus than do naive consumers. In other words, the existence
of sophisticated consumers enables firm to charge a higher price. The main driver of these
results is the existence of naive consumers. They have a lower willingness to pay than do the
sophisticated consumers because they always underestimate the future network sizes. Even if
the price was set higher than the naive consumers’ willingness to pay, sophisticated consumers
recognize that simultaneous purchase by all consumers would enable all consumers to gain
a positive surplus. However, they also know that, unfortunately, the naive consumers never
purchase before the network size has actually expanded. Therefore, sophisticated consumers
have no option but to participate in the network first, before its size expands, to entice
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the naive consumers to subsequently enter into the network. In other words, sophisticated
consumers have to take the leadership role to indicate the true value of the network to the
naive consumers. This is the reason why the existence of the naive consumers sustains the
firm’s sequential-diffusion strategy in equilibrium. Moreover, sophisticated consumers have
to endure the disadvantages of the small network size before the naive consumers join the
network, whereas naive consumers can enjoy the largest network size immediately, as soon
as they purchase the good. For this reason, the sophisticated consumers never gain a greater
surplus than that of the naive consumers.
An important lesson from our model for firm selling durable network goods is that in-
formation about the current network size must be disclosed by the firm at the beginning of
every period. If the firm does not construct such an information disclosure system, naive con-
sumers never realize that the sophisticated consumers have purchased the good. Then, this
dampens the incentives of the sophisticated consumers to join the network first and induce
the subsequent entries of the naive consumers. That is, the firm has to make information
about the current number of users and/or the sales volume public.
In addition, it is important not only to disclose information about the current network
size, but also to provide an environment that assists more consumers to predict the future
network size correctly. Proposition 5 shows that the firm can benefit from an increase in the
ratio of sophisticated consumers. Therefore, the firm should supply information to consumers
to decrease the proportion of naive consumers who cannot predict the purchase decisions of
others. For example, the existence of a word-of-mouth viral site, where consumers can
communicate with each other about the good, may help naive consumers to determine other
consumers’ purchasing intentions.
Moreover, in Proposition 12 and the corresponding numerical analysis, we show that,
as the effective network size becomes larger, the advantage of fixed pricing (committing to
a fixed price) against responsive pricing (pricing without commitment) becomes greater.
Recent movements to establish an IoT might make consumers more sensitive to others’
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purchase decisions and enhance the managerial significance of committing to a fixed price.
Often, in reality, it may be difficult to promise to hold prices constant for long periods. A
pre-order system or subscription sales is a good potential strategy for doing so. Using our
model, we explain how to use pre-order sales to commit to a fixed price. At the beginning
of period 1, the firm announces that it will receive pre-orders at the price pseq and that
the deadline for pre-orders is the end of period 2. Sophisticated consumers may pre order
at period 1. At the beginning of period 2, the firm should announce the number of pre
orders it has received. After observing the announcement, the naive consumers follow the
sophisticated consumers to pre order the good. This strategy not only enables the firm to
credibly commit to maintaining its price at pseq during the pre order period, but also informs
sophisticated consumers of such a commitment. As a result, the firm can sell the good to all
consumers at pseq.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the optimal pricing and diffusion of durable goods that exhibit
positive network externalities. A key departure in our paper from many existing studies is
to consider the existence of naive consumers as well as sophisticated (rational) consumers.
In our model, in contrast to sophisticated consumers, naive consumers do not anticipate the
network sizes at any future period, simply believing that the current network size will be
maintained for future periods. This heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their
beliefs about future network sizes significantly alters the optimal pricing strategy and the
diffusion of durable goods.
We conclude by noting some limitations of our model and discussing potential avenues
for future research. This paper assumes that consumers live for infinite periods, that is,
they do not exit from the network that they join. This assumption means naive consumers
underestimate the network value of the good compared with sophisticated consumers. In a
model where consumers can exit from the network, naive consumers who cannot predict the
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exit of other consumers would overestimate the network value of the good. In this case, the
results obtained in this paper might change. That is a potentially fruitful direction for future
research, but it requires a more complex model, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The comparison of ueS(t = 1|pseq) and ueN(t = 2|pseq) yields the following condition.
ueS(t = 1|pseq) > ueN(t = 2|pseq) ⇐⇒ v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC >
v(nS + 1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ λC >
v(nS + 1)− v(nS)
v(n)− v(nS) ≡ λ¯C
Thus, if λC > λ¯C , the price is set at p
seq = ueN(t = 2|pseq). Otherwise, the price is set at
ueS(t = 1|pseq). Using this, we can obtain the corresponding profit, as shown in Proposition
2. When λC is larger than λ¯C , the surpluses of the sophisticated and naive consumers,
respectively, can be computed as follows.
V seqS = uS(t = 1|pseq)− ueN(t = 2|pseq)
=
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
− v(nS + 1)
1− λC =
λC{v(n)− v(nS)} − {v(nS + 1)− v(nS)}
1− λC
V seqN = uN(t = 2|pseq)− ueN(t = 2|pseq) =
v(n)
1− λC −
v(nS + 1)
1− λC =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC
Similarly, the consumer surplus can be computed when λC is smaller than λ¯C , as follows.
V seqS = uS(t = 1|pseq)− ueS(t = 1|pseq) = 0
V seqN = uN(t = 2|pseq)− ueS(t = 1|pseq) =
v(n)
1− λC −
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
= v(n)− v(nS)
Proof of Corollary 2
First, when λC ≤ λ¯C , V seqS = 0 and V seqN = v(n) − v(nS) > 0. Thus, it holds that
V seqS < V
seq
N . Next, when λC ≥ λ¯C , we can show V seqS < V seqN as follows.
V seqN − V seqS =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC −
λC{v(n)− v(nS)} − {v(nS + 1)− v(nS)}
1− λC
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= v(n)− v(nS) > 0
Proof of Lemma 1
For λC ∈ [λ¯C , 1), it is easily seen that psim < pseq as follows.
pseq − psim = v(nS + 1)
1− λC −
v(1)
1− λC > 0
We can also show psim < pseq for λC ∈ [0, λ¯C ] as follows.
pseq − psim = v(nS) + λCv(n)
1− λC −
v(1)
1− λC =
(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)− v(1)
1− λC
>
v(nS)− v(1)
1− λC > 0
Proof of Proposition 3
Two possible cases should be considered.
(i) 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C
In this case, it holds that pseq = ueS(t = 1|pseq). Comparing the profits under simultaneous-
and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the following condition for piseq > pisim.
piseq − pisim = (nS + δFnN)
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
− n · v(1)
1− λC
=
(nS + δFnN) {(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)} − nv(1)
1− λC
> 0
⇐⇒ δF >
nv(1)− nS {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)}
nN {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)} ≡ f1(λC)
where f ′1(λC) = −
nv(1) {v(n)− v(nS)}
nN {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)}2
< 0
(ii) λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
In this case, it holds that pseq = ueN(t = 2|pseq). Comparing the profits under
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simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the following condition for piseq >
pisim.
piseq − pisim = (nS + δFnN)v(nS + 1)
1− λC − n ·
v(1)
1− λC
=
nSv(nS + 1)− nv(1) + δF · nNv(nS + 1)
1− λC
> 0
⇐⇒ δF > nv(1)− nSv(nS + 1)
nNv(nS + 1)
≡ f2(λC)
Proof of Proposition 5
Fix the total number of consumers at n. Let nS = αn and nN = (1 − α)n. First, it is
obvious that psim = v(1)/(1− λC) is independent of α. Next, pseq can be rewritten as
pseq =

v(αn) +
λCv(n)
1− λC if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C ,
v(αn+ 1)
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1,
which is increasing in α. Finally, we prove that piseq is also increasing in α as follows.
piseq = pseq · αn+ δF · pseq · (1− α)n = npseq {α + δF (1− α)}
∂piseq
∂α
= n
∂pseq
∂α
{α + δF (1− α)}+ npseq(1− δF ) > 0
Proof of Proposition 6
We find the optimal price such that all sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1
and all naive consumers purchase at period 2. Then, we will confirm that sophisticated
consumers have no incentive to postpone their purchases to the next period. That is, there
is no equilibrium in which only a portion of the sophisticated consumers purchase in period
1.
In order for sequential diffusion to occur in equilibrium, the period 1 price must be high
enough to satisfy pˆseq1 > v(1)/(1− λC) because naive consumers also purchase at period 1 if
it holds that pˆseq1 ≤ v(1)/(1− λC).
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First, we consider the period 2 price, pˆseq2 , given that all sophisticated consumers purchase
at period 1. At the beginning of period 2, all naive consumers observe that the current
network size is nS. In addition, each of them anticipates that if he/she joins the network,
the network size will become nS +1, which will be continued over future periods. Therefore,
the firm sets the period 2 price at pˆseq2 = v(nS + 1)/(1 − λC) to make all naive consumers
purchase.
Next, let us consider the decision regarding the period 1 price, pˆseq1 . The indirect utility
of sophisticated consumers at period 1 is given by:
VS = v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − pˆ
seq
1 .
Note that pˆseq1 should be set so that each sophisticated consumer has no inventive to postpone
purchase to the next period. Consider a situation in which one sophisticated consumer
deviates from the equilibrium path. In the situation, at period 2, the naive consumers
consider that the network size will become nS if he/she purchases the good. Therefore, the
period 2 price will be set at p′2 = v(nS)/(1− λC). Because all remaining consumers actually
join the network, the sophisticated consumer who deviated will gain the following surplus:
V ′S =
v(n)− v(nS)
1− λC
The condition under which all sophisticated consumers have no inventive to deviate from
purchasing at period 1 is that VS ≥ δCV ′S holds. Note that V ′S is discounted by δC , not by
λC = δC(1− β). We find the condition for pˆseq1 as follows.
VS ≥ δCV ′S ⇐⇒ v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − pˆ
seq
1 ≥
v(n)− v(nS)
1− λC × δC
⇐⇒ pˆseq1 ≤
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC =
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC
Thus, the firm charges the following period 1 price.
pˆseq1 = max
{
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC , 0
}
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As described above, this price has to satisfy pseq1 > v(1)/(1 − λC). The condition that the
parameters should satisfy is as follows.
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC >
v(1)
1− λC ⇐⇒ δCβ <
v(nS)− v(1)
v(n)− v(nS)
Using pˆseq1 and pˆ
seq
2 , we obtain the corresponding profit of the firm and the consumer surplus,
as shown in Proposition 6.
Finally, we prove that there is no equilibrium in which only a portion of sophisticated
consumers purchase at period 1 and the remaining sophisticated consumers do so at period
2. Let ntS be the number of sophisticated consumers who purchase at period t. Given that
n1S sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1, each naive consumer at period 2 expects
that the network size will become n1S + 1 if he/she purchases the good. That is, the price of
period 2 will be set at p2 = v(n
1
S +1)/(1−λC) < pseq2 . Note that this price is lower than the
equilibrium price. Eventually, all naive consumers join the network and derive the following
surplus.
V 2S = VN =
v(n)− v(n1S + 1)
1− λC
In this case, sophisticated consumers who purchase at period 1 obtain the following surplus.
V 1S = v(n
1
S) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − p1
Consider a deviation such that one sophisticated consumer postpones purchasing to period 2.
Then, each naive consumer at period 2 expects that the network size will become n1S if he/she
purchases the good. That is, the price of period 2 will be set at p2 = v(n
1
S)/(1− λC) < pseq2 .
Eventually, all naive consumers join the network and derive the following surplus.
V ′S =
v(n)− v(n1S)
1− λC
There is no incentive for such a deviation if and only if:
V 1S ≥ V ′S
33
⇐⇒ v(n1S) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − p
seq
1 ≥
v(n)− v(n1S)
1− λC × δC
⇐⇒ p1 ≤ (1 + δC − λC)v(n
1
S)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC <
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC = p
seq
1 .
That is, to ensure that such a deviation is unprofitable, the period 1 price should be set
at a lower price than the equilibrium price (i.e., p1 < p
seq
1 ). However, setting such a low
price never improves the profit of the firm. Therefore, there is no equilibrium such that only
a portion of the sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and the remaining do so at
period 2.
Proof of Proposition 7
Comparing the profits under simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the
following condition for pˆiseq > pisim.
pˆiseq > pisim ⇐⇒ nS (1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC + δF · nN
v(nS + 1)
1− λC > n
v(1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ δF > nv(1)− nS {(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)}
nN · v(nS + 1) ≡ fˆ(δC , β)
Proof of Proposition 8
This proof is similar to that for Proposition 6. First, we consider the price of period
2, p˜seq2 , given that all sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1. At the beginning of
period 2, all naive consumers observe that the current network size is nS. In addition,
each of them anticipates that if he/she joins the network, the network size becomes nS + 1,
which will continue over future periods. Therefore, the firm sets the price of period 2 at
p˜seq2 = v(nS + 1)/(1− λC) to induce all naive consumers to purchase, which is equal to pˆseq2 .
Next, let us consider the decision on the period 1 price, p˜seq1 . When the firm commits
to setting the period 2 price at p˜seq2 , sophisticated consumers cannot win any price discount
if they postpone their purchase to the next period. Therefore, even if the price of period 1
is set at sophisticated consumers’ willingness to pay, they will purchase the good at period
1, which implies that the firm set the price of period 1 at p˜seq1 = uS(t = 1|pseq) = v(nS) +
λCv(n)/(1− λC).
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Using p˜seq1 and p˜
seq
2 , we obtain the corresponding profit of the firm and consumer surplus
as shown in Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 9
Comparing the profits under simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the
following condition for p˜iseq > pisim.
p˜iseq > pisim ⇐⇒ nS
{
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
}
+ δF · nN v(nS + 1)
1− λC > n
v(1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ δF > nv(1)− nS {(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)}
nN · v(nS + 1) ≡ f˜(λC)
Proof of Proposition 11
We consider the following two cases.
(i) 0 ≤ λC < λ¯C
In this case, from the definition of λ¯C , p
seq < pseq2 holds as follows.
λC < λ¯C ⇐⇒ v(nS) + λCv(n)
1− λC <
v(nS + 1)
1− λC ⇐⇒ p
seq < pseq2
Next, we prove that pseq1 < p
seq, as follows.
pseq − pseq1 = v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC −
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC
=
(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)− (1 + δC − λC)v(nS) + (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC
=
δC{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC > 0
That is, pseq1 < p
seq < pseq2 holds for λC ∈ [0, λ¯C).
(ii) λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
First, it can be confirmed that pseq2 = p
seq = v(nS + 1)/(1− λC) holds. Next, we prove
that pseq1 < p
seq
2 , as follows.
pseq2 − pseq1 =
v(nS + 1)
1− λC −
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC
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=
v(nS + 1)− v(nS) + δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC > 0
That is, pseq1 < p
seq
2 = p
seq holds for λC ∈ [λ¯C , 1).
Proof of Proposition 12
Suppose that the discount factor for the firm δF is sufficiently large. We consider the
following two cases.
(i) 0 ≤ λC < λ¯C
In this case, it holds that β > 1− λ¯C/δC .
piseq < pˆiseq ⇐⇒ (nS + δFnN)
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
< nS
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC + δF · nN
v(nS + 1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ δC
δF
· nS
nN
<
v(nS + 1)− v(nS)
v(n)− v(nS) − λC
⇐⇒ δC
δF
· nS
nN
< λ¯C − λC
(ii) λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
In this case, it holds that pseq1 < p
seq
2 = p
seq as shown in Proposition 11. Therefore,
piseq > pˆiseq always holds.
In sum, we obtain the condition for piseq < pˆiseq as follows.
δC
δF
· nS
nN
< λ¯C − λC
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